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Abstract: The transition from Fordism to post-Fordism has been accompanied by profound
changes in the spatiality of west European states. The hierarchical, top-down and redistributive
structures that typified the Fordist welfare state have been replaced by more complex spatial
configurations as elements of economic and political power have shifted both downwards
to subnational territorial levels and upwards to the supranational level. A major debate has
developed around the nature of these emerging forms of state spatiality and of the processes
underpinning their formation. This paper examines how these processes have operated in the
particular case of the Republic of Ireland. Here, the spatiality of the state was founded on
a peculiar post-colonial combination of a localised populist politics and a centralised state
bureaucracy. While this arrangement was quite suited to the spatial dispersal of industrial
branch plants which underpinned regional policy in the 1960s and 1970s, it has become
increasingly problematic with the more recent emergence of new trends in the nature and
locational preferences of inward investment. This is reflected in the profound conflicts that have
attended the formulation and implementation of the National Spatial Strategy, introduced in
2002. The result is a national space economy whose increasing dysfunctionality may now be
compromising the very development model upon which Ireland’s recent spectacular economic
growth has been built.
Keywords: state spatiality, spatial Keynesianism, Ireland, National Spatial Strategy, gateway
cities
Introduction
As defined by Brenner (2004a), the term “state spatiality” combines
both the geographical configuration of a state’s territory (its external
and internal boundaries and the territorial organisation of its political
and administrative systems) and the spatial dimensions of the state’s
intervention in socioeconomic processes within that territory, including
both spatially targeted interventions and indirect spatial effects of
aspatial actions. In capitalist states, such configurations evolve in
order to facilitate the interests of hegemonic elements in prevailing
regimes of capital accumulation (Jessop 1990) and remain quite stable
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during the period of dominance of a particular accumulation regime:
Harvey’s (1982) celebrated “spatial fix”. New accumulation regimes
tend to emerge in response to major shifts in technology and/or socio-
political conditions, and seek to put in place new spatial structures
which, responding to both the threats and opportunities presented by
these shifts, serve to facilitate regime legitimation, the reproduction
of labour and, above all, the production and circulation of capital.
However, these new spatial structures are superimposed on inherited
configurations and are modified by them. The organisation of state
space at any historical conjuncture therefore represents a multilayered
territorial mosaic involving the interweaving of political geographies
established at different moments of historical time.
The transition, in the 1970s and 1980s, from the Fordist regime of
accumulation built around the mass-producing welfare state to a post-
Fordist regime of flexible neoliberalism is widely associated with a
profound restructuring of state spatialities throughout western Europe,
whereby the centralised Fordist welfare state, oriented to the spatial
equalisation of living standards and employment opportunities within
its borders, was replaced by a decentralised neoliberal state wherein
regional economies pursued their own economic interests through direct
participation in the global economy. This paper seeks to establish the
applicability of this broad model to the evolving spatiality of the Irish
state over the period in question. The next section of the paper reviews a
range of interpretations that have been placed on the restructuring of state
spatialities in western Europe which accompanied the transition to post-
Fordist neoliberalism. The following sections examine, respectively,
how the colonial experience profoundly shaped the spatiality of the
Irish state that emerged from the independence struggle of the early
twentieth century and how the attraction of inward investment in the
1960s and 1970s was accompanied by a policy of branch plant dispersal
that amounted to an almost extreme version of the spatial equalisation
described by Brenner. The inherent inadequacies of this policy were
brought into sharp focus by new spatial tendencies flowing from the
spectacular upsurge of the Irish economy in the 1990s, leading to the
formulation of a National Spatial Strategy (NSS), the key features of
which closely followed Brenner’s depiction of post-Fordist neoliberal
decentralisation. However, this strategy immediately ran aground on the
rocks of the inherited spatiality of the Irish state whose fundamental
features were directly incompatible with the strategy in question. The
nature and implications of the contradictions underlying this mismatch
between existing and projected spatialities are discussed in some detail
before the paper concludes with some observations on how the Irish
experience contributes to contemporary debates on state restructuring
in Europe.
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Fordist and Post-Fordist State Spatialities
in Western Europe
The form of Fordism that emerged in western Europe in the decades
after the Second World War was characterised by centralised state
systems presided over by social democratic governments committed
to the maintenance of mass collective consumption via welfare transfers
and public service provision. In the economic sphere, such governments
practised conventional Keynesian macroeconomic management while
implementing industrial policies formulated at a national level, practices
which were rendered feasible by the fact that most west European
economies at this stage were largely self-contained, in that economic
production, for the most part, was in the hands of indigenous enterprises
and primarily served domestic markets (Brenner 2004b). Problems
of spatially uneven economic development were generally addressed
through standardised policies involving measures to encourage the
establishment of industrial branch plants in “lagging” regions (Brenner
2004a; Sto¨hr 1989). This combination of welfare transfers, public
service provision and branch-plant industrialisation constituted a form
of “spatial Keynesianism” designed to equalise living standards and
employment opportunities between regions (Brenner 2004b). In this
system, the main functions of local and regional government were
delivery of centrally funded public services and application of central
government socioeconomic policies within their operational districts
(Loughlin 2001a). Thus, the dominant feature of the spatiality of west
European states was a strongly hierarchical (but spatially equalised,
in socioeconomic terms) structure, with local government units nested
within the territories of regional government (where this existed) in an
integrated national jurisdictional system dominated by the institutions
of the central state.
The prolonged period of stagnation and recession during the 1970s
and 1980s ushered in a powerful swing to the right in European
politics, leading to the widespread election of conservative governments
pursuing neoliberal economic programmes involving the dismantling
of the welfare state, the primacy of monetary over employment
policy, privatisation, deregulation and an emphasis on fostering
entrepreneurialism through supply-side economic policies (Brenner
2004b). This political turn at the national level was accompanied, in
virtually all European Union member states, by the transfer, to a greater
or lesser extent, of political and/or administrative functions from the
national to regional and/or local levels (Loughlin 2001a; Parkinson,
Harding and Dawson 1994). To an extent, and in some cases, this trend
can be attributed to bottom-up demands for political devolution and/or
the desire on the part of central governments to create more flexible and
effective systems of public administration (Gualini 2004; Keating 1998;
C© 2010 The Author
Journal compilation C© 2010 Editorial Board of Antipode.
From Spatial Keynesianism to Post-Fordist Neoliberalism 1183
Parkinson, Harding and Dawson 1994). There have also been
suggestions that the transfer of greater responsibility for their own affairs
to regional and local governments is an inevitable consequence of the
inability of the national state to maintain its former level of welfare-state
activity in the face of fiscal pressures and the rollback of the state as part
of the neoliberal agenda (Brenner 2004b; Jones 2001; Loughlin 2001a).
This functional and fiscal contraction of central governments and
the associated transfer of capabilities to the subnational level have in
turn been seen as part of a broader process of “hollowing out” (Jessop
1994) whereby European states have been progressively losing their
former capacity to control affairs within their own borders (Brenner
1998). Other key factors in this process have been the concession of
powers and functions to the European Union (which in turn has itself
been seeking to strengthen the position of subnational regions vis-a`-vis
national governments within member states) and other supranational
organisations (Gualini 2004; Loughlin 2001b) and the impact of
accelerated globalisation (facilitated in large part by the liberalisation
of international trade and investment—itself a consequence of the
neoliberal political turn) on the capacity of national governments to
regulate economic activity within their borders (Held et al 1999; Ohmae
1995).
There has been considerable debate over the extent to which
hollowing-out has actually led to a real diminution of the political
capacity of national governments or whether there has instead been
a spatial rescaling of the ways in which governments operationalise
their powers (Jones 2001; MacKinnon and Phelps 2001). In particular,
a substantial literature has been generated around the proposition
that administrative and political decentralisation has been pursued by
national states as part of a strategy for strengthening the capacity of
national economies and their constituent spatial units to compete in
the global marketplace. The decline of older industrial regions that
accompanied the collapse of Fordism and the increasing concentration
of newer forms of economic activity in metropolitan regions at
both national and European levels have created demands for new
types of policies for stimulating development in regions outside
the immediate influence of these core areas (Brenner 2004b). The
combination of the neoliberal stress on self-reliance, competitiveness
and entrepreneurialism, the emergence of new regional development
thinking emphasising endogenous growth, cluster promotion and
learning and innovation systems (MacLeod 2001) and accelerating
international flows of foreign direct investment has prompted the
formulation of policies and programmes designed to foster the creation
of regionally coherent economic and business structures capable of
competing for export markets and mobile investment. Typically, these
have involved the devolution to regional and local governments of
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new revenue-raising powers and planning and economic development
functions; the creation of new governance structures at the regional
level involving “development coalitions” embracing local government,
business interests and other stakeholders; infrastructural investments
designed to enhance the attractiveness of areas to potential inward
investors; and increasing competition between regions for mobile
investment.
The decentralisation of government functions can therefore be seen
as a centrally devised strategy designed to enhance aggregate national
competitiveness with respect to the global economy. This viewpoint
is supported by the adoption, in 1999, by the EU member states of
the tenets of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), a
policy framework for guiding spatial planning and development within
the EU (Committee on Spatial Development 1999). The key aim of the
ESDP is the achievement of economic and social cohesion across the
EU in a way that is economically, culturally and environmentally
sustainable. The main mechanism for achieving this is to supplant
national and regional hierarchical core/periphery systems with a more
balanced, “polycentric”, urban system wherein regional urban centres
would articulate distinctive regional economies, which in turn would
be integrated directly into the global economy rather than into their
respective national economies as had hitherto been the case. In
developing direct links to the global economy, regional centres would act
as “gateway” cities, through which flows of investment and information
would diffuse through the regional hinterland. The ESDP, therefore,
conflates regional and urban development policy into a single spatial
strategy for territorial development based on the city-region as focal
unit (Ward and Jonas 2004). This approach fits well with Brenner’s
(1998:5) view that city-regions are once again regaining the role of
“geo-economic engines of the world system” which they previously
possessed before the formation of the modern world system of territorial
states.
The various change processes identified here, including globalisation,
the growing role of supranational organisations, the hollowing out
of the national state, functional devolution to the regional level and
the increasing participation of regional economies in global markets
and production systems, have inevitably engendered profound changes
in the spatiality of west European states (Loughlin 2001b). The
relatively straightforward nested hierarchies of power that characterised
the Fordist state have been replaced by new structures of great
complexity:
The current period of globalization involves a proliferation of spatial
scales, their relative dissociation in complex tangled hierarchies (rather
than a simple nesting of scales), and an increasingly convoluted mix
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of scale strategies as economic and political forces seek the most
favourable conditions for insertion into a changing international order
(Jessop 2002:112).
While the actual configurations emerging from this diverse mix
of tendencies vary from case to case, depending on “the specific
restructuring strategies adopted by modernising political alliances
within each national and local context” (Brenner 2004b:474), one
recurring theme has been the “growing ‘territorial non-coincidence’ . . .
between the scales on which capital accumulation and state territorial
power are organized” (Brenner 1998:4) as regional economies become
increasingly interconnected in international networks (Gualini 2004).
While this has inevitably weakened the regulatory capacity of national
states, they still retain considerable functionality, and continue to play
the key role of providing an institutional framework (and, to an extent,
financial assistance) to allow city-regions to enhance their capabilities
of attracting mobile investment and competing in the global economy
(Brenner 1998; Ward and Jonas 2004).
The paper now turns to an investigation of the changing spatiality of
the Irish state in the light of the general themes and trends identified in
the foregoing section.
The Spatiality of the Irish State
What is now the Republic of Ireland (referred to as “Ireland” in
the remainder of this paper) could be regarded as the last case of
western Europe’s nineteenth century nation-state formation episode,
following its securing of effective formal political independence in
1922. However, almost alone among western Europe’s nation states, the
Irish state had emerged from several hundred years of colonial control,
during which period its economy had become thoroughly extraverted
(Amin 1976) in contrast to the autocentric structures which were the
norm elsewhere in the region (Breathnach 1988; Mjøset 1992). Thus,
production was largely confined to agricultural produce for export to
Britain, with industrial goods being imported in return. This simple
fact shaped the spatiality of the colonial economy: interregional trade
was minimal; provincial urban centres acted as collecting points for
agricultural products and distribution points for industrial goods and as
administrative outposts of the colonial administration. The latter was
centred in Dublin which also served as the main port for external trade
and comprised a classic colonial primate city that dominated the urban
system in terms of size and range of functions.
In class terms, the economy was dominated by petty capital in the
form of commercial farmers and associated urban-based merchants and
professionals. Ireland’s lack of industrialisation (outside the northeast
which had remained within the UK) and long history of mass
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outmigration meant there was neither an organised working class nor
the kind of industrial bourgeoisie which had come to assume a high
degree of state control in many of Europe’s early industrialising nations
(Gill 2008; Kirby 1997). Colonial politics having been dominated
by the recently eliminated landlord class, the petty bourgeoisie had
little experience of party politics apart from their involvement in the
county councils that were the central element in the system of local
government introduced in 1898, an involvement that tended to confirm
the highly localised horizons and political ambitions of this key social
group.
Party politics in Ireland crystallised around the two main parties
(Fianna Fa´il and Fine Gael) that emerged from the fragmentation
of the national movement in the aftermath of independence. While
appealing to different segments of the social structure, these were
both essentially populist and pragmatic parties without a clear political
programme—a common phenomenon in postcolonial states that lack
the social structure to support class-based politics (Kirby 1997). Given
the highly localized orientation and limited political ambitions of the
main political parties, from the beginning the state bureaucracy came
to occupy a powerful position in the configuration of the Irish state.
This consisted essentially of the former British colonial administration
which had survived almost intact the transition to independence. This
was a highly centralised, well-organised and competent bureaucracy
which had no experience of political accountability within Ireland and
little contact with local civil society, and whose colonial function of
conservative managerialism became the hallmark of its administrative
approach in the newly independent state.
In its new guise as the civil service of the fledgling Irish state, this
bureaucracy found itself dealing with a parliament and government
whose membership was mainly drawn from rural and small-town
Ireland and had a limited interest in, and capacity for, national-level
government. Given its established expertise in this area, therefore, the
civil service assumed a level of autonomy and degree of control over the
administration of the central state which was unique in western Europe
(Breen et al 1990). From the beginning, Irish parliamentary democracy
assumed a “clientelist” form (Hazelkorn 1986), with parliamentary
representatives seeing it as their main function to act as intermediaries
between their local constituents (or “clients”) and the offices of
the central state with respect to routine concerns such as access to
government grants, social welfare entitlements and medical services (a
function which grew in importance as the rudiments of a welfare state
were put in place in the 1950s and 1960s).
The Irish state, therefore, can be characterised as combining a
highly localised party politics and a highly centralised system of public
administration (Laffan 1996). The local government system introduced
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in 1898 had limited powers and functions, with most public services
being delivered directly from the central state. Both parliamentary
representatives and state bureaucrats share a deep-seated opposition to
the strengthening of local government due, in the case of the latter,
to their profoundly centralist tendencies and, in the case of the
former, to the fact that a strengthened local government would tend to
undermine their role as local/central intermediaries (Breathnach 1992).
Indeed, while the general tendency in the second half of the twentieth
century was for west European states to progressively devolve public
service functions to subnational tiers of government (Sharpe 1988), in
Ireland the reverse occurred, with several key functions (health, main
roads, agricultural extension) being transferred from local government
to the central state. Thus, today Ireland has one of the most centralised
systems of government in the world (Laffan 1996), with the activities of
local government being largely confined to environmental maintenance,
upkeep of local roads, control of physical development and a greatly
reduced social housing function. This is reflected, in spatial terms, in
the disproportionate concentration of population in the East (Dublin
and adjacent counties) region (39% of the national total in 2006) and
particularly in the concentration of decision-making functions (56% of
managers and executives) and high-level services (65% of employment
in banking and finance).
Spatial Keynesianism, Irish-style
One consequence of the intense localism of the Irish political process
is that all central government measures are evaluated by politicians, not
necessarily on their general merits, but on how they are likely to impact
on local constituencies. As a result, it has generally been difficult, if not
impossible, for the central government to introduce measures that have
a wide impact which is spatially selective (eg rationalisation of hospital
services). This was brought into sharp relief by the growing influx of
foreign direct investment that materialised following the adoption by
the Irish government, in the late 1950s, of a policy of promoting export-
oriented industrialisation via such investment. A major debate ensued
concerning the locational policy that should be applied to incoming
branch plants, with expert opinion favouring spatial concentration in
a limited number of “growth centres” (Breathnach 1982). However,
when a major state-sponsored consultants’ report (Colin Buchanan and
Partners 1968) advocated such an approach, a public outcry emanating
from areas not favoured by the report caused the government to shy
away from its proposals. In fact, with Ireland’s entry to the EU in
1973 expected to lead to a further acceleration of inward investment,
in the preceding year the Irish government published a set of Regional
Industrial Plans for the period 1973–77, which envisaged an almost
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extreme form of the “industrial decentralization, urban deconcentration
and spatial equalization” that Brenner (2004b:460) regarded as typifying
Fordist regional policies in western Europe.
These plans were formulated and implemented by the Industrial
Development Authority (IDA), the state agency responsible for
attracting foreign investment to Ireland and which, in 1969, had also
been given responsibility for regional industrial development within
the country. The IDA regional plans brought spatial engineering to an
unprecedented level of specification (Breathnach 1982). Not only was
an industrial job creation target for the plan period set for each of the
nine Irish planning regions, but within each region, neighbouring towns
were assigned to clusters, for each of which a job creation target was
also set. In all, 58 such clusters were identified, embracing a total of
209 towns and villages. The principal mechanism used by the IDA for
achieving its job creation targets was a major programme of ready-
built “advance” factory construction under which 746,000 m2 of factory
floor space was constructed in 156 different locations between 1972
and 1982 (the planning approach adopted for 1973–77 was continued
for the 1978–82 period). The distribution of this floor space was
almost perfectly correlated with the population of the recipient towns,
indicating that the IDA was attempting to allocate new industrial jobs in
accordance with the population—the ultimate in spatial equalisation of
access to industrial employment. The IDA’s regional plans therefore
represented a perfect example of the “redistributive spatial policies
designed to alleviate intra-national territorial inequalities by extending
urban industrial growth into underdeveloped, peripheral regions” which,
according to Brenner (2004a:2), were put into effect by most western
European states during the 1960s.
The 1970s witnessed a remarkable regional redistribution of
manufacturing employment in Ireland, with new inward investment
(which accelerated following EU entry) being guided mainly to non-
urban areas, especially in the west of Ireland, while established (and
mainly indigenous) industry, which was concentrated in the larger urban
centres and had been established with a high level of tariff protection,
contracted significantly with exposure to external competition following
EU entry. Thus, while the previously unindustrialised western areas,
where the highest level of regional aid was available, experienced
45% growth in manufacturing employment between 1971 and 1981,
there was virtually no growth in the rest of the country. Figure 1
shows how the very substantial inter-regional differences in the
distribution of manufacturing industry which existed in 1961 had been
greatly reduced by 1981. In particular, whereas in 1961 the East (ie
Dublin) region’s share of national manufacturing employment was 64%
higher than its share of population, by 1981 this had been reduced to
just 3%.
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Figure 1: Ratio of population share to manufacturing employment share, Irish planning
regions (see Figure 2 for a map of planning regions)
Spatial Impact of the “Celtic Tiger”
In the 1980s, the Irish economy was badly affected by international
recession associated with post-Fordist economic restructuring, and at
the end of the decade per capita GDP stood at just two thirds of the then
EU average. However, the early 1990s ushered in a prolonged period of
high economic growth which pushed the country to the EU forefront in
terms of per capita GDP. The key factor in the creation of the so-called
“Celtic Tiger” economy was a major surge in new inward investment in
both manufacturing (real output in foreign manufacturing plants grew
threefold between 1991 and 2000) and export services (mainly software,
financial services and back-office activities), whose share of foreign-
firm employment rose from just 5% in 1989 to 35% in 2001 (Breathnach
2007a).
While most areas of the country experienced substantial growth in
employment and incomes during the boom years of the 1990s, this
period saw a significant further enhancement of the East region’s
already dominant position within the Irish space economy. Services
had now become by far the main source of employment growth, and
as shown earlier in this paper, high-level service employment was
disproportionately concentrated in the East region. Of even greater
significance was the very high level of concentration (75% in 2000) in
the East region of employment in the rapidly expanding export services
sector.
The National Spatial Strategy
By the turn of the new century, therefore, the Irish government
was coming under increasing pressure to address a double-edged
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Figure 2: Irish planning regions (pre-1987)
regional problem: increasing congestion in the East region due to
poorly planned rapid growth, and substantial (and growing) income
and employment disparities between the latter region and the rest of
the country. Thus, the National Development Plan for 2000–2006,
announced in 1999, identified “balanced regional development” as a
key plan objective. In furtherance of this objective, the government
commissioned the Department of Environment and Local Government
to prepare a National Spatial Strategy (NSS) that would identify a set
of policy measures designed to shape the country’s long-term spatial
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development. This strategy was eventually launched in November 2002
(Government of Ireland 2002).
In approach and tone, the NSS was very strongly influenced by
the European Spatial Development Perspective. Thus, in place of the
redistributive focus of the regional industrial plans of the 1970s, the
NSS sought to develop the capability of the individual Irish regions to
exploit the opportunities created by the globalisation process in order
to participate directly in the international market place. This would
be achieved through the cultivation of regionally specific capabilities
that would both foster local entrepreneurship and attract mobile
international investment. Regional development would be focused on
the main regional cities whose traditional role as subordinate centres
in the national urban hierarchy would be superceded by a new role
as “gateways” linking their respective regions directly to the global
economy. The aim was to establish in each of these gateway cities
specialised clusters of business activities and support infrastructures that
would achieve the “critical mass” which would allow them to compete
sustainably in global markets.
In short, the NSS proposed to effect, over a 20-year period, nothing
less than a major restructuring of the Irish space economy, whereby the
historic core/periphery structure focused on Dublin would be replaced
by a new polycentric structure built around relatively autonomous city-
regions (Davoudi and Wishardt 2005). We see here a clear enunciation
of the kind of “competitive city-regionalism” which Ward and Jonas
(2004) have identified as a key element of the new post-Fordist
European territorial order. The NSS therefore constitutes what Brenner
(2004b:473–474) terms a “glocalising scale-making project” whose
central goal is “to position strategic local spaces competitively within
global or supranational circuits of capital accumulation”.
Implementing the National Spatial Strategy
The prospects of the NSS’s ambitious aims ever achieving fruition
have been profoundly compromised by the existence of powerful
forces that had both created, and been created by, the established
economic and political spatiality of the Irish state—what Brenner
(2004b:455) has termed the “entrenched morphology” of existing state
spatial organisation. The fundamental conflicts between the visions and
assumptions of the mainly academic consultants who had provided
the central thrust of the NSS and the perceived self-interest of both
the political and bureaucratic actors who would have responsibility
for its implementation were already apparent in the NSS document
itself, and became even more so as the aftermath of the strategy’s
publication unfolded. Two key aspects of the NSS document reflect
the tensions being referred to here: the selection of gateway cities and
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the governance structures required for effective implementation of the
strategy.
According to the NSS document, the identification of gateway cities
should be based on their potential for achieving the critical mass that
would allow them to compete effectively with Dublin and other cities
overseas for investment on an ongoing basis. However, in its treatment of
this issue, the document is extraordinarily inconsistent. On the one hand,
it expresses doubts about whether even Cork, Ireland’s second city, with
a population of 186,000, possessed the base of firms, support services
and facilities required to achieve critical mass. Indeed, the document
goes on to suggest that the four largest provincial cities (Cork, Limerick,
Galway and Waterford) might be developed as an “inter-connected
and developed network of co-operating and complementary cities”
(p 45), thus echoing the argument advanced by Ward and Jonas (2004)
that neighbouring city-regions must collaborate in order to survive and
compete in the globalised economy. According to the document, such
a network, with a combined population of some one million people,
offered the “best prospects for establishing critical mass of the type and
scale capable of competing with that of the Greater Dublin Area” (p 45).
Yet, despite the fact that none of the four largest provincial urban cities
were thought to approach the level of critical mass required to function
effectively as gateway centres, the NSS goes on to identify four further
potential gateways, including a combination of small neighbouring
towns in the midlands and a rather hypothetical partnership between
Letterkenny in County Donegal and the much larger Derry, located in
Northern Ireland (Figure 3 and Table 1).
There is obvious evidence here of the kind of politically motivated
proliferation of designated centres which has repeatedly diluted and
undermined attempts at spatially selective investment programmes the
world over since the 1960s (Parr 1999). This is further indicated by
the fact that the NSS also identifies nine “hub” towns which are seen
as “supporting” the national and international role of the gateways
and in turn “energising” smaller towns and rural areas within their
sphere of influence (p 12); recognises that many other county and
larger sized towns in Ireland are “critical elements” in the structure
for realising balanced regional development (p 38); and envisages
that various medium-sized towns in each region will act as “local
capitals” providing a range of services and opportunities for employment
(p 12). While these passages may simply be window-dressing designed
to mollify the population located outside the designated gateways, they
nevertheless attest to the profound difficulties attending any attempt at
a spatially selective approach to regional development in Ireland.
A second major deficiency in the NSS document is its failure
to address the governance structures required for the effective
implementation of the strategy. The kind of gateway development
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Figure 3: National Spatial Strategy gateway centres
envisaged by the NSS (including the forging of strong mutually
supporting links between the gateways themselves and between the
gateways and their hinterlands) requires forms of governance capable
not just of coordinating a wide range of economic, social and
infrastructural activities and facilities at regional level, but of driving
such coordination. Elsewhere in Europe, according to Brenner (1998),
the promotion of cities and regions as sites for transnational capital
investment has involved the devolution to such cities and regions of a
range of formerly centralised functions and responsibilities in order to
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Source: Census of Population (2002).
allow these places to directly and effectively mobilise local resources in
pursuit of such investment. Through this new functionality, “local and
regional states . . . are acquiring increasing structural significance within
each territorial state’s internal administrative-organizational hierarchy”
(Brenner 1998:16).
There has been no parallel devolution of this kind in Ireland,
where there is no effective tier of regional government, where local
government has a minimal range of functions, where most elements
of gateway development (enterprise promotion, health and education,
transport, communications and energy) are centrally controlled, and
where structures for managing and coordinating the implementation
of public policy at territorial level are extremely weak (Laffan 1996).
The NSS never addresses this issue, instead satisfying itself by calling
for voluntaristic co-operation between local authorities which, in the
absence of a regional governance structure1 and with very few relevant
development functions residing at local government level, offers little
prospect of effective gateway development.
The NSS’s proposed designation as gateways of urban centres which
have no prospect of attaining critical mass, and the failure to propose
new governance structures which would involve devolution of an array
of significant powers from central control, indicates the continued
dominance in the Irish state structure of those interests favouring, on
the one hand, spatial dispersal of public largesse (ie politicians) and
on the other hand, continued centralisation of the control of largesse
dispersal (the central bureaucracy). We can see here how a vision for
a new spatiality for the Irish state which offers the possibility of more
effective economic development at both national and regional levels in
the long term has virtually no chance of realisation when set against this
powerful coalition of political and bureaucratic interests favouring the
status quo.
The lack of commitment—if not indeed downright opposition—to
the NSS on the part of the Irish state apparatus is clearly apparent from
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the fate of the NSS since its launch in 2002. Despite a commitment,
explicitly stated in the NSS document, that the NSS would be embedded
in the policies and programmes of all government departments and
agencies, this simply has not happened; in fact, most government
programmes have behaved as if the NSS did not exist. For example, in the
roll-out of the National Development Plan 2000–2006 (which identified
balanced regional development as a key objective to be achieved via
a gateway-based spatial strategy), there was little regard to regional
development considerations in the allocation of funding for projects,
while no specific measures for developing the gateway centres were
implemented (Fitzgerald et al 2003). Indeed, in the final review of the
Plan, conducted by the Department of Finance, the issue of regional
development was not addressed at all and the word “gateway” appears
nowhere in the document.
Perhaps the most blatant instance of the ignoring of the NSS in
government policy thinking was an announcement, in December 2003
(1 year after the NSS was launched) by the Minister for Finance
of a radical plan to relocate the headquarters of eight government
departments and 10,300 civil service staff out of Dublin to provincial
locations. One might have expected these headquarters functions, as
well as at least a significant fraction of the relocated personnel, to be
allocated to the gateway centres identified in the NSS, especially since
the NSS document contains an express commitment that the government
“will take full account of the NSS in moving forward the progressive
decentralisation of Government offices and agencies” (Government of
Ireland 2002:120). In fact, none of the headquarters functions, and only
13% of the jobs, were allocated to gateway centres; the balance of the
jobs, and all the headquarters functions, were dispersed among no less
than 48 locations outside the designated gateway towns. Davoudi and
Wishardt (2005) have suggested that this was intended to forestall the
possible loss by the government of political support in towns which had
not been named as gateways or hubs in the NSS. There is further evidence
here of how the intense localism of Irish politics has created a “mismatch
between long-term goals and short-term political expediency”, with
the resulting “policy fragmentation and opportunism” (Davoudi and
Wishardt 2005:132) undermining the implementation of the NSS.
Discussion
Brenner (1998) has suggested that the key role of the nation-state today
is to provide an institutional framework to allow city-regions to enhance
their capabilities of attracting mobile investment and competing in the
global economy. There is a very considerable literature which argues that
the key elements of such a framework should be the devolution from the
central state to the regions not only of the functions required to achieve
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this capability enhancement but of political control over these functions
(Cooke and Morgan 1998; Jones 2001; Morgan 1997; Pike 2004).
To the extent that these arguments are valid, the continued adherence
of the Irish state to a rigidly centralised political-administrative system
has the effect of preserving a spatiality which is dysfunctional with
respect to the emerging developmental needs of the space economy.
This, then, raises the question as to how, and by whom, changes can be
wrought in order to correct this dysfunctionality.
According to Brenner (2004b:455), new state spatialities emerge
where modernising forces possess the strength to modify the pre-
existing spatial order “significantly enough to create qualitatively new
geographies of state territorial organization and/or state regulatory
activity”, in the face of opposition from what Lipietz (1994) terms the
“conservative defenders of the old spaces”. In Ireland, such modernising
forces simply do not exist. Put simply, the strength and competence of
the central state and the culture of dependence articulated through the
entrenched system of clientelism have stifled innovation and creativity
and profoundly undermined local initiative and capacity, thus effectively
blocking the emergence of countervailing forces from within civil
society (Laffan 1996; Nanetti 1996). Nor are such forces likely to
emerge from the business sector, with indigenous petty capital strongly
intertwined with the party political system and the foreign sector
remaining aloof from intervention in the conduct of local public affairs.
It may be, therefore, that some form of crisis is required to effect
fundamental change in the spatiality of the Irish state. As Brenner
(2004b:457) has observed: “During periods of sustained economic
crisis, extant frameworks of urban governance may be viewed as
ineffectual, and powerful social forces may promote the reorganization
of inherited local and/or regional state structures.” One possible source
of crisis would be a situation where the failure of the Irish regions to
mobilise their competitive capabilities would see them being reduced to
marginalised backwaters while the Dublin region continued to develop
its global role built upon its growing base of foreign-owned high-tech
manufacturing and service activities (Breathnach 2000). An alternative
scenario would see the Dublin region itself losing its ability to continue
to attract high levels of inward investment due to problems of congestion
deriving from a combination of overdevelopment and poor transport,
settlement and environmental planning. Given Dublin’s dominant role
as a location for inward investment in recent years, such an outcome
would constitute a crisis situation of truly national proportions.
A third possible source of fundamental political change is the current
(early 2009) economic crisis which has affected Ireland more deeply
than most other European economies, in large part due to the failure of
the Irish government to rein in the cavalier investment behaviour of the
intertwined banking and property development sectors, leading to a
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pile-up of toxic debt and the virtually total collapse of the banks’
share value. The manner in which the government allowed this crisis to
develop, and its feeble attempts to deal with the crisis when it did come to
a head, have given rise to a serious public debate concerning the capacity
of the current Irish political system to deal with major national crises of
this type. A key focus of this debate has been the calibre of personnel
elected to parliament primarily on the basis of their ability to look after
the needs of local constituents. Significantly, the state bureaucracy has
also been subjected to some sharp criticism over its poor regulatory
performance and its apparently “cosy” relationship with elements of the
business sector. There has been talk of electoral reform which would
produce parliamentary representatives with a stronger focus on national
issues and policies. Were this to occur, not only would it ring profound
changes in Irish political culture, but it would also engender a different
type of relationship between the political and bureaucratic sectors which
might lead to long-term changes in the balance of power between the
two.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the dangers of overgeneralising the
outcomes of the putative trend towards a “new regionalism” among
west European states in the era of post-Fordist neoliberalism. The case
of Ireland shows that rumours of the demise of the nation-state are
greatly exaggerated. What makes this case particularly significant is
that Ireland was considered to be the most globalised economy in the
world by Foreign Policy magazine in 2004, yet has managed to avoid
the movement towards political decentralisation which some have seen
as the inevitable outcome of the globalisation process. This points
to the importance of “context specificity”, a key element of Pike’s
(2004:2145) “heterodox” approach to the study of regional governance
which “seeks explicitly to recognise the particularities of place shaped
by specific historical trajectories of economic, social, political, and
cultural change”. In particular, the Irish case corroborates the argument
advanced by Ward and Jonas (2004: 2134) that:
the trend—geographically uneven as it is—towards competitive city-
regionalism is best understood as representing an ongoing, dynamic,
and conflict-ridden politics of and in space (which, in turn, is “scaled”
in a variety of ways) rather than a smooth switch to a new postnational
era of capitalist territoriality.
Endnote
1 There is a tier of so-called regional authorities, established in 1994 for the purpose
of monitoring the spending, at regional level, of EU structural funding. While these are
identified in the NSS as having a “major” role to play in the implementation of the
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strategy, in fact they are largely ineffectual institutions, with minimal staffing and no
powers (Fitzpatrick Associates 1997).
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